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Home Economics

Nationalism and the Making of 'Migrant Workers' in Canada

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1 Home(lessness) and the Naturalization of 'Difference'

The overweening, defining event of the modern world is the mass movement of raced populations, beginning with the largest forced transfer of people in the history of the world: slavery. The consequences of which transfer have determined all the wars following it as well as the current ones being waged on every continent. The contemporary world's work has become policing, halting, forming policy regarding and trying to administer the movement of people. Nationhood – the very definition of citizenship – is constantly being demarcated and redemarcated in response to exiles, refugees, Gastarbeiter, immigrants, migrations, the displaced, the fleeing, and the besieged. The anxiety of belonging is entombed within the central metaphors in the discourse on globalism, transnationalism, nationalism, the break-up of federations, the rescheduling of alliances, and the fictions of sovereignty. Yet these figurations of nationhood and identity are frequently as raced themselves as the originating racial house that defined them. When they are not raced, they are ... imaginary landscape, never inscape; Utopia, never home.

Toni Morrison, *Home*

The process of making and maintaining national borders is integral to the material, existential, and ideological practices that organize the contemporary exercise of power. National borders are a set of institutional relationships based on the law, the market, and extant social relations within and across particular spaces. While most people experience national borders as fixed, in reality they constantly shift and move in accordance with changing social relations. Ever since the emergence of the global system of national states only a few hundred years ago, new national states have been carved out of previously

existing ones as a prelude to or an outcome of confrontations between the more and the less powerful. Thus, there are constant reorganizations of the 'national community' at ever smaller and higher levels of geographical scale.[1]

Within the global system of national states, borders do not affect everyone similarly. For a small, select group they are mere formalities. Business people, government officials, certain states' armed forces, tourists, and the personnel of legitimated international governmental and non-governmental organizations, for instance, traverse them practically at will and with very little thought. On the other hand, borders never leave others alone. In particular, for people assigned a 'migrant worker' or 'illegal' status in the countries in which they live, work, and sometimes die, borders follow them to school, to work; indeed they encounter borders in every aspect of their lives. Moreover, when James Clifford (1998:367) notes that 'at least since 1492, the outside world is guaranteed to find you,' he draws our attention to the fact that in the global economy the simultaneous existence of national borders and borderless worlds confronts even those who stay put.

National borders and their relationship to ideas of *home*, and in particular, how borders make many people *homeless* in the very places where their lives are lived is the topic of this book. By examining the social organization of one Canadian state category of entry, residency, and work, that of migrant workers, I discuss how it is the very construction of an always-limited sense of homeyness in the Canadian 'nation,' what Benedict Anderson (1991) calls 'nation-ness,' that makes migrant workers non-members of Canadianized society. A type of *home economics* is at play in this process of hierarchically organizing various groups of people through differential state categories of belonging. There is a materiality to the 'differences' between 'citizens,' 'immigrants' (i.e., permanent residents), and migrant workers; this materiality is based in the relationship between ideas of *nation* and those of *race*, *gender*, and *class*.

In this introductory chapter I discuss how the idea of home has been both occupied by nationalist practices and colonized by nationalized imaginations. Within such conceptualizations of home, those with national subject identities come to participate in what Dorothy E. Smith (1990) calls 'relations of ruling.' By making themselves at home in the nation, the national state relies on the complicity of those with national subjectivities to make common sense of the highly differential treatment accorded those classified as the nation's Others, particularly those

placed in legal state categories, like migrant worker, that organize their foreign-ness within Canadian space.

In the following chapter, 'Globalization and the Story of National Sovereignty,' the making of migrant workers is situated within the neoliberal turn in Canadian public policy in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The knowledge that we have of this period, however, is not unproblematic, and I examine the dominant discourses of this latest period of capitalist globalization among progressive and even left intellectuals in Canada to understand how their conceptualizations are informed by – and significantly entrench – nationalized forms of consciousness and practices. I show that the characterization of this latest period of capitalist globalization, as one when national state sovereignty was lost, works to centre the *foreignness* of certain capital investments and certain workers as the key problem of neoliberalism.

Within this framework, not only is the relationship between national states and capitalists obfuscated but the fortification of national state boundaries come to be seen as necessary for the protection of 'society.' Such thinking has particularly profound effects in relation to the organization of national labour markets. Acceptance that the national state *ought* to be sovereign legitimates practices that differentiate between citizens and those categorized as 'foreigners' not only across national borders but also within the labour market in Canada. The result is the subordination of all those who can be rendered 'foreign' and an intensification of competition between workers, both globally and within nationalized spaces.

In chapter 3, 'Imagined States: The Ideology of "National Society,"' I extend this discussion to more deeply analyse how liberal styles of governance shape our consciousness about the nature of human society itself. Within liberal democratic forms of ruling, society is made coterminous with the national state through ideas of the existence of the Public or civil society. I examine how ideas of *freedom*, and their manifestation in the identities and material realities of free or unfree workers, rely on national state practices for determining the scope of belonging to this Public.

By problematizing ideas of civil society, through which national subjects come to believe that the state rules *for* them against Others, I show how freedom, and its corollary of unfreedom, have been made 'unpolitical.' Its depoliticization has led to an increase and entrenchment of migrant workers within unfree employment relations in Canada over the last thirty-odd years. The expansion of unfreedom, thus,

calls into question classical theories of capitalist political economy that fail to account for the significance of unfree employment relationships within capitalist social relations. By centring the analysis of capitalism on the experiences of free workers, the lived experiences of those rendered unfree through practices of nationalism, racism, and sexism are made invisible, and this leads to fatal flaws in our analysis of how capitalist social relations are actually accomplished.

In chapter 4, 'Canadian Parliamentary Discourse and the Making of "Migrant Workers,"' five years of parliamentary debates on immigration, international trade, and finance within the House of Commons are analysed. A textual analysis of the discursive practices of Ottawa's parliamentarians and their construction of 'national problems' and their 'solutions' makes evident how intertwining ideas of nation, race, and freedom are brought together to organize state practices in ways that facilitate the restructuring of global capitalist social relations and the labour market in Canada. In making migrant workers, the Canadian state made fully realizable the category of 'foreign worker.'

In chapter 5, 'Canada's Non-Immigrant Employment Authorization Program (NIEAP): The Social Organization of Unfreedom for "Migrant Workers,"' I provide a detailed account of how the NIEAP relies on the legal differences organized between citizens, immigrants (i.e., permanent residents), and non-immigrants (or migrant workers) to ensure employers access to a 'just-in-time,' unfree, migrant workforce that conforms to employers' demands for more flexible, cheaper, and more vulnerable workers. By comparing the numbers of people admitted to Canada over the years as either permanent residents or migrant workers, I document an alarming shift in the (im)migration status of those entering Canada to work – a shift that results in the denial of permanent resident status to the vast majority of (im)migrants and their relegation to the ranks of a temporary, unfree labour force. By legalizing the highly subordinated status of migrant workers, the NIEAP is shown to be a vehicle through which the social category of foreigner is *realized*.

In concluding my study of the making of migrant workers for the Canadian labour market, with chapter 6, 'Rejecting Global Apartheid: An Essay on the Refusal of "Difference,"' I challenge the nationalization of space and identity that legitimates the subordinated status of those made into non-members of Canadian national society. As becomes clear with an examination of the NIEAP and its 'differential inclusion' of 'foreign workers' as unfree temporary labour within Canadianized space, I show that the discursive practices of border control are thoroughly ideological. Ever-increasing restrictions on international migration work not to restrict the entry of migrants into Canada but to restrict their mobility, rights, and entitlements within this nationalized space.

Contemporary border control practices, therefore, are products of and produce a global regime of apartheid in which at least two different legal systems operate within the space of any given national state – one that regulates national subjects and another that regulates foreign objects. In this, the imposition of identities, be they state categorical identities or identities imposed by ideas of race, nation, and gender, is crucial. In calling for an end to nationalized imaginations and the practices organized – and made common sense of – through them, I distinguish between social practices of difference-making and those based on diversity – the simultaneous respect for individual singularities and shared commonalities based on practice rather than identity. I end by adding my voice to the growing social movement for a world without borders, a world where people have the ability both to 'stay' and to 'move' according to their own self-determined needs and desires, a world where no one is made homeless.

Occupied Homes and the Making of National Subjectivities

Home, and the ways it helps to organize ideas of family, household, ethnic community, and nation, is one of the most naturalized of concepts and therefore one of the most dangerous. Modernist ideas of home, in particular, help to organize and legitimate the differential treatment of those living within the same space. Differences between diverse indigenous people, citizens, immigrants, and migrant workers are organized through ideas of Canada being the home of some but not Others. With the overlaying of the idea of *home* onto that of *nation*, migrant workers are easily understood as foreigners labouring within a 'foreign labour market' instead of being an integral component of Canadian society.

Home acts as a conceptual bridge between modern notions of family and nation, so much so that, as Anders Johansen (1997:171) notes, the nation is understood to be a 'magnified version of the family and the circle of close friends.' This is well captured by former British prime minister Margaret Thatcher, who characteristically proclaimed that 'the family and its maintenance really is the most important thing, not only in your personal life, but in the life of any community, because this is the unit on which the whole nation is built' (in Rutherford, 1990:12).

Such a link between family and home is not accidental. Luce Irigaray (1993) points out that modernist ideas of family and home are inseparable from patriarchal social relations, observing that the feminization of the family home does not elevate the status of women but that of men, who feel entitled to depend on the housewife's homemaking practices. Doreen Massey points out that the understanding of the separated private sphere of the family home is extended to society which is considered a public or collective home. As the father has authority over 'his' family, the state is seen as the political and geographical expression of the authority of the nation. Massey argues that the primoridialization of homeland security is itself gendered and states (1994:71) that the 'need for the security of boundaries, the requirement for such a defensive and counterpositional definition of identity,' rather than being some universal truth, is in fact a specific and '"culturally masculine" tendency.' Moreover, with the modern family's emphasis on biological connection, hegemonic conceptions of home are based on the idea that there exist communities of similarity. In this, 'the National family [becomes] a symbolic home' (Morley, 2000:104). Thus, while society, as Eric Hobsbawm (1991:67-8) notes, 'cannot belong to us as individuals' we are encouraged to imagine that it can still belong to Us as a People.

As Philip Tabor (1998:218) puts it, 'house identified with the self is called a home, a country identified with the self is called a "homeland."' 'Its territory is our home; its people is marked by a common "character," much like the members of a family; its past is a "heritage" passed down from our 'forefathers' (Johansen, 1997:171). The ties between family, nation, and state are elaborated by Anne McLintock (1995:357), who observes that 'the term nation derives from natio: to be born – we speak of nations as "motherlands" and "fatherlands." Foreigners "adopt" countries that are not their native homes and are nationalized in the "national family." We talk of the "family of nations" of "homelands" and "native" lands. In Britain, immigration matters are dealt with at the Home Office; in the United States the president and his wife are called the First family.'

Home, then, is an idea that masquerades as a place. Having a home within a nation, in particular, is not a geographical signpost but an ideological signifier. Yet, as David Morley (2000:8) notes, 'if home is not necessarily a spatial concept, it is nonetheless often lived out as if it were such.' Because of this, it profoundly shapes our consciousness of the relationship between place and 'belonging.' Its power rests in its

ability to project modernist formulations of home back through human history so that our contemporary understandings of homelands come to be seen as merely the outcomes of some supposedly primordial need for rootedness.

Ironically, it was after the onset of European capitalist colonization, with its practices of mass displacement, that processes of constructing boundaries between homes and societies were intensified. Stronger Insides and Outsides were constructed as colonizers made contact with those they colonized and as profits were accrued from differentiating between the two. This, in turn, strengthened the association between family and nation. Krishan Kumar (1994) points out that in the early seventeenth century, separate houses and households came to be more clearly demarcated from each other. Concomitantly, a greater division of labour was implemented within the family home, and the boundaries between members and non-members of the family household became starker.

Eventually, the household in Europe came to be imagined as consisting of only the nuclear, patriarchal family with its fatherly head. Just as the capitalist reorganization of productive activity as either work or non-work according to its value (or valuelessness) in the marketplace helped to create the idea of different gendered spheres of existence (the public–private divide being perhaps the central one), European colonization gave shape to notions of discrete, ethnically bounded homelands. Indeed, a number of domestic metaphors and tropes of privacy have helped to organize the legitimacy for the exclusion of people said to not belong within the 'national home' (Cohen, 1996:68). In this, it is not simply the boundaries of national homelands that are said to be in need of protection but also the boundaries between members and non-members of the national family. Looking at how European colonizers made themselves at home in particular colonies is instructive. The doctrine of *Terra Nullius* that allowed the Americas and the South Pacific to be viewed as empty lands awaiting European civilization and cultivation was, of course, very useful in the 'founding' of 'White settler societies,' such as Canada. The notion that indigenous peoples were never at home on these lands worked to depoliticize their homelessness after the advent of colonialism and the official redistribution of land to White settlers.

Representing indigenous peoples as strangers and European colonial settlers as at home helped to close the conceptual gap between the newness of the New World and nationalist references to antiquity for their

exclusive claims to territory. This was further strengthened throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as elites within the Americas mobilized ideas of the bounded national family to mark the territories they sought to secure 'independence' for – the new national states of which they would be the heads.

The continuous displacement and forced assimilation of diverse people to make new homelands, not only in White settler colonies but also within each and every national state, has not disrupted the notion that national communities are formed through shared, common characteristics. The nation continues to be seen as historically rooted in blood and soil. The concept of *ethnicity*, reliant as it is on the idea that there exist a People that 'naturally' belongs to a given place, figures prominently in this.

Ethnicizing is a process that roots culture to a particular place, one that has greatly informed our ideas of the nation as a homey space – as a primordial homeland (Morley, 2000:212). Imagining the modern nation has entailed the dividing of humanity along lines of ethnicized groups and positing that each human being belongs to only one – such group. Massey (in Mackay, 1997:204) argues that 'in that process the boundaries of the place, and the imagination and building of its 'character' [become] part and parcel of the definition of who is an insider and who is not; of who is a 'local' and what that term should mean, and who is to be excluded.' This works to delimit home as that which stands in contrast to all things defined as foreign or 'unfamiliar.' In other words, the nation occupies not only a territorial space but also an ideological space of belonging.

Being at home in the land – just as *not* being at home – is based both on what Anjelika Bammer (1992: ix–x) calls 'mythic narratives, stories the telling of which has the power to create the 'we' who are engaged in telling them' as well as constructing 'the discursive right to a space (a country, a neighbourhood, a place to live) that is due us ... in the name of the 'we-ness' we have just constructed.' Morley (2000:217) argues that such a discourse 'allows us to imagine that we do not have to share our space with anyone else unless they are of exactly our own kind by virtue of consanguinity.' What such a conflation allows is the identification of family cum nation as race. This has had a particularly damaging effect on migrants.

Historically, as ideologies of highly racialized nations as natural homelands became hegemonic, people's understanding of geographical movements profoundly shifted. Indeed, as borders became more

fixed, migrants increasingly were portrayed as trespassers. In other words, as the nation became more homey to those seen as its members, migrants were made even more homeless. To be a migrant became tantamount to being a vagrant. Moreover the imposition of the idea that homelessness is akin to godlessness allowed vagrancy to be understood as a moral (and often a criminal) offence to the community of 'honest residents.' Migrants were thus strongly associated not only with losing their homes but also their moral standing.

This attitude was strengthened as the national state system expanded. Saskia Sassen (1999:78) argues, with regard to events in Europe in the mid-1800s, that 'the coupling of state sovereignty and nationalism with border control made the "foreigner" an outsider.' Within this 'metaphysics of sedantarism,' to use Lisa Malkki's term (quoted in Hebdige, 1995:100), domestic and foreign spaces were related through ideas of purity and contamination. Over time, the naturalization of xenophobia mobilized the idea that nations have some sort of right to preserve their 'purity.'

Anti-miscegenation discourses have become the basis of asserting ethnic identities, and this has often led to virulent forms of homey racism. Michael Keith and Steven Pile (1993:20) have identified such discourses as 'a reactionary vocabulary of the identity politics of place and a spatialised politics of identity grounded in the rhetoric of origins, of exclusion, of boundary-making, of invasion and succession, of purity and contamination ... [in short,] the glossary of ethnic cleansing.'

Increasingly, goals of maintaining a supposed homogeneity are fought for not just in the name of race purity but of preserving 'cultural integrity.' Indeed, postmodern practices of racism and nationalism rely less on ideologies of race separation and more and more on ideas sanctifying culture. An impoverished view of 'culture' has come to overlie notions of biological race so that what connects identity to place is now said to be the historical existence of certain 'traditions.' In this, 'tradition [becomes] the cultural equivalent of the process of biological reproduction' (Morley, 2000:65). Étienne Balibar refers to this kind of racism as a 'differentialist racism' (in Hardt and Negri, 2000:192). This form of racism is heavily reliant on nationalist practices and is evidenced in some of the earliest attempts to debunk psuedoscientific rationales for racism. The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), in its 1951 'Statement on the Nature of Race and Race Differences' illustrates this well when it states that 'Americans are not a race, nor are Frenchmen, nor Germans; nor ipso facto is any other

national group' (as cited in Guillaumin, 1995:104). In the process of trying to delegitimize some (and only some) commonsensical ideas of the existence of separate and discrete races of humans, such statements further naturalized the existence of 'different nations.' This is not simply a shift in the meaning of race, so that nation becomes race just as in earlier analyses where class came to be conflated with ideas of race (see Goldberg, 1992:564). Rather, it signals the growing importance of nationalism and the maintenance of nationalized borders in the ongoing reconfiguration of racialized identities.

In such 'cultural fundamentalisms' (Stolcke, 1995:5), the difference between nationals and immigrants is the most naturalized. Thus, 'instead of ordering different cultures hierarchically, cultural fundamentalism segregates them spatially, each culture in its place ... [and] the 'problem' of immigration is constructed as a political threat to national identity and integrity on account of immigrants' cultural diversity' (ibid.:8). According to Malkki (1997:42, 62) the assumption that any given culture is rooted in a particular geographical place and is best kept homogeneous 'actively territorializes our identities, whether cultural or national ... [and] directly enables a vision of territorial displacement as pathological.' This leads to a suspicion of migration so that mobility is seen only as crisis-producing (Sutcliffe, 2001). Consequently, as John Bird (1995:119) notes, 'the common experience of the homeless and the migrant is to be made to feel out of place.'

While such practices are often thought as being best understood to be *racist* forms of discrimination, Ghassan Hage (2000:38) usefully points out that racist ideologies that mark people for exclusion because of their foreign standing, rely on *nationalist* practices with their 'categories of spatial management.' Hage therefore, cautions us to pay attention to the significance not only of racist practices but of *nationalist* ones, as well, for this will help us to uncover the *territorial* dimension of contemporary moral panics concerning (im)migration. Indeed, *not* paying attention to the spatial character of how certain (im)migrants face oppression and exploitation – seeing these as only a result of processes of negative racialization – has led to the serious absence of studies to investigate homey forms of racism. In this sense, nationalism both organizes and helps to mask racialized forms of difference that organize inequalities.

Since 'concepts of nation, people, and race are never very far apart,' as Hardt and Negri note (2000:103), an examination of nationalist practices helps to explain why within the homeland 'not all strangers are equally

strange' (Peter Fitzpatrick, cited in Morley, 2000:249). Nationalist practices are concerned with issues of spatial allocations of people and the supposedly 'rightful' position of various differentiated people within national states in ways that racist practices are not always. In this regard, Hage (2000:28) maintains that nationalist practices are those that 'assume, first, an image of a national space; secondly, an image of the nationalist himself or herself as master of this national space and, thirdly, an image of the "ethnic/racial other" as a mere object within this space.' Members of the nation have a sense of 'empowered spatiality' in relation to Others who do not, so that 'in every [epithet of you] "go home," there is an "I want to and am entitled to feel at home in my nation"' (ibid.:40).

There is, therefore, a particular kind of national subject that is important to construct and to maintain for power to be wielded within modern national states. Michel Foucault's (1991) discussion of self-regulation helps us to understand the crucial importance of the creation of a particular subjectivity to the realization of national state power. Thus, historically in Canada, 'the entities being regulated were in the first instance the characters of individuals ... but the nation was also seen as held together by a common subjectivity, whose constant re-creation at the individual level ensured the continued survival of the collectivity. The collectivity thus organized had very specific class, gender and racial/ethnic characteristics' (Valverde, 1991:33).

National Self-regulation, then, is not only about constructing and regulating a proper national subject. Instead, having the nation stand in for various levels of homeyness – family, household, ethnic community, all of which are seen as discrete and secure sociogeographical environments – also requires the existence of a 'threat' to create a secure sense of Self. In this regard, Hage (2000:37), using insights from Lacanian psychoanalysis of 'fantasy spaces,' maintains that nationalist discourses would fall apart if there were not Others against whom the nation could be defined. In the never-ending struggle to realize the nation, Hage (1993:99–100) notes that 'in fact, the other is what allows the nationalist to believe in the possibility of that goal. It spares him the anxiety of having to face the fact that such a goal is impossible ... by the very fact of being posited as that which threatens it.' Opposition to foreigners, thus, becomes a way for those Self-defined as being at home to argue for their own fuller integration into the nation.

Hence, Hage argues that nationalist practices are based on discourses of undesirability rather than on discourses of inferiority that

underscore racism (2000:37). While discourses of inferiority do not necessarily necessitate Self-defence, discourses of undesirability motivate *action* towards the neutralization of whomever is presented as threatening the security of the homeland. Because the nation is presented as a community of similarity, threats always come to be defined as foreign, regardless of the actual location of the people so identified.

In this the sharp distinction between what Henry Mayhew (in Stallybrass and White, 1986:128–9) calls the 'wanderers' and the 'civilized tribes' produces the image of migrants as polluting the home society. Excluding those who are deemed to be filthy and undesirable, as Anne Michaels shows in her novel *Fugitive Pieces* (1996), comes to be seen as a national *obligation*. About the Nazi policy of exterminating those always constructed as ever-outsiders to the German nation, Michaels writes: 'Nazi policy was beyond racism, it was anti-matter, for Jews were not considered human. An old trick of language, used often in the course of history. Non-Aryans were never to be referred to as human, but as "figuren," "stücke" – "dolls," "wood," "merchandise," "rags." Humans were not being gassed, only "figuren," so ethics weren't being violated. No one could be faulted for burning debris, for burning rags and clutter in the dirty basement of society. In fact, they're a fire hazard! What choice but to burn them before they harm you?'

Foreigners are perceived as weakening the bonds of community said to hold the national family together. Migrants, especially those arriving from places deemed as far (not necessarily only geographically but culturally) from the Self-identity of those claiming home-ownership rights, challenge the very idea of the existence of national homelands. Phil Cohen (1996:75) puts it this way: 'If immigrants put down roots, if ethnic minorities make a home from home, then they are perceived to threaten the privileged link between habit and habitat upon which the myth of indigenous origins rests.'

The very mobility of those particular migrants deemed as 'too strange to be Us' calls into question the segmentation of the world into discrete, demarcated zones of natural belonging. In this regard, Nora Rathzel (1994:91) notes that such migrants are threatening because they 'make our taken-for-granted identities visible as specific identities and deprive them of their assumed naturalness,' hence, 'once we start thinking about them, becoming aware of them, we cannot feel 'at home' any more.' For this reason, the mobility of Others 'becomes a basic form of disorder and chaos – constantly defined as transgression and trespass' (Cresswell, 1996:87). A comment by a Cambodian woman refugee living in Paris puts it succinctly: 'We are a disturbance ... Because we show you in a terrible way how fragile the world we live in is' (in Morely, 2000:152).

The strong association between migration and chaos is borne of colonial flows. The 'similarity' of some and the extraordinary 'strangeness' of Others is one consequence of the global mobility of capital, goods, and people. Many supposedly natural homelands exist only because of the forcible dispossession, displacement, violent assimilation, and sometimes extermination of those who previously built their lives and livelihoods in these places. This is most obvious in the case of the 'New World' where indigenous populations were severely reduced, at times entirely wiped out, through war, forced labour, and disease in order to pave the way for the world's first nation-states (see Anderson, 1991). But it is also the case in the so-called Old World where European national states were built on the ashes of many diverse pre-existing societies. This is also true in Asia and Africa, where explicit colonial divide-and-rule policies translated into ongoing processes of neocolonialism after the emergence of independent national states ruled by a new set of elites (see Miles, 1993; Anderson, 1991). National liberation movements did not liberate people but placed them under the rule of new 'leaders' – this time often of the same 'ethnic type' as the (re)colonized.

Within this complexity of migration, displacement, and the simultaneous experiences of homelessness and claims of homeyness, it is important that we not confuse the problem of colonization with migration per se. Colonization is, first and foremost, a relationship of exploitation and oppression. Colonization can be experienced both as conquest *and* as scattered crossings. The problem with colonization is not the 'strangeness' of the colonizers but their rapacious greed. Indeed, many past colonizers (the 'French' and 'Indian Aryans,' to note two such groups) are now imagined as 'related' to, or the same People as, those whom they colonized.

The migrations of people – be they displaced peasants or jobless urban dwellers, kidnapped Africans, Asian coolie labourers, or, more recently, the supposedly voluntary movements of professionals, the undocumented migrations of the poor, or people fleeing political persecution – are not equivalent to the migrations of colonizers. In fact, it is the mobilities of the former, diverse as they are, that led to the conflation of migration with misanthropy, especially in relation to migration into places that colonizing groups have claimed as their own homelands.

The association between migration and madness has become even more pronounced with the expansion and further development of the apparatus of the national state. There has been a further conflation between concepts of home and ideas of nations resulting in the almost complete collapse of the space between civil society and the national state (see Urry, 2000). Difference-making devices have been focused within national states so that in the twentieth century progressively greater distinctions were made between various kinds of migrants, so that, as Sassen (1999:78) notes, 'the state now [has] the power and the institutional legitimacy to exclude refugees from civil society.'

To more fully understand the relationships between state practices and forms of social relations based on ideas of a homey racism that allows some to claim exclusive homelands while leaving Others homeless, we therefore need to rethink the separation of state from society that ideas of civil society put into place (see Marx and Engels, 1969). The ideology that something called *civil society* exists organizes the myth that those with a strong sense of homey entitlement – what Hage (2000) calls 'governmental belonging' – in the nation create 'the state' which is supposed to govern *for them* as an objective and autonomous (even if this is 'relative') force (see Poulantzas, 1973).

In fact, Adam Ashforth (1990:15, emphasis added) points out that the claim that the state 'exists to further the welfare of *all* subject to it, that is – the Common Good' is key to its legitimacy. However, in the construction of this Common Good, Ashforth's argument needs to be extended to account for the centrality of separating and identifying those national subjects *for* whom the state rules and those foreign objects whom the state rules *over*. Constructing the national state – the community of the nation with its governing state – requires the formation of a nationalist model of imagination, or what Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000:113) call a 'totalitarian democracy.'

The ideology of the state acting in the 'Common Good,' often formulated as 'democracy,' shapes the legitimacy for the exclusion of Others not only from the space of the nation but from claims to the entitlements associated with membership in it. As Phil Cole (1998:137) notes, the 'existence of a liberal polity made up of free and equal citizens rests upon the existence of outsiders who are refused a share of ... [its] goods' This is not coincidental. Throughout the history of national states, the purported enemy or foreigner has never been limited to those *outside* of national space. In fact, the targeting of people represented as foreigners *within* the nation has often been more of a

spur to nationalist activity than outside threats have been (see Hyslop, 1999:405).

Nancy Fraser (1993:8), in rejecting classical theories of national citizenship with their ideas of progressive inclusion of all in the nation, points out that the organization of civil society, or what has been called the public sphere of capitalist liberal democracies, is premised on many layers of separations and exclusions. There is both the separation of state from (civil) society and the existence of separate spaces of belonging for various types of people classified according to deeply entrenched ideologies of separate races and gender roles and, perhaps most legitimately, by the belief that there are different territorial spaces for differently nationalized people. Full inclusion is not a possibility within the logic of national citizenship.

The notion of the nation as a homey place for all who live there (even as a potentiality), then, is ideological. It conceals the fact that the exclusions organized through it are integral – not tangential or merely contingent on historical – processes. In this respect, Avner Offer's (1989:235) argument that racist practices are *part of* the liberal 'virtues of democracy, civic equality and solidarity' takes on greater relevance. So, too, does John Holloway's (1994:32) argument that, because the state is formed through assertions of national sovereignty that are constructed through the organization of racialized differences between Us and Them, 'the very existence of the state is racist.'

The existence of a group of people considering themSelves to be part of the nation (or civil society) and therefore regarding themSelves not as ruled over but as ruled *for* helps to secure ruling relations and the continued existence of the national state. In other words, the construction of a civil or social sphere becomes a way to naturalize the power of the state to rule. It is therefore 'misleading to envisage the dimension of the *social* as the state's antagonist or its prey. In modern liberal societies the social is, characteristically, the field of governmental security considered in its widest sense' (Gordon, 1991:35). By claiming to represent the national family, the state secures its power over both its members and those positioned as their negative reference point.

With regard to national styles of ruling, then, we need to pay more careful attention to Kobena Mercer's (1994) question: 'Why the need for the nation?' Examining '*who* needs it, *who* manufactures the 'need' for it, and *whose* interests it serves' may be an even more urgent task (Burton, 1997:234). The state is one of the main beneficiaries of the existence of the nation. Nation-building practices constitute an important and *con-*

tinuous aspect of state practices and contribute to ongoing processes of state formation. However, the state, like the nation, is *imagined*. As with the imagined character of nations, this does not mean that the state does not exist. It does mean, however, that the state, like the nation, is a form of social relations, an always-incomplete form that requires the continual reproduction of civil society for its own rationalization. The legitimacy and therefore the power of the state relies upon the existence of the imagined community of the nation for whom it is said to operate.

Concepts of citizenship are the ideological glue that bonds the nation to the state. Citizenship provides the legal framework through which the state performs its role as ruler *for* the nation. Together they legitimate the power of the state to subordinate foreigners. Denying the rights, entitlements, and protections that citizens have to those positioned as non-citizens is a crucial feature of how hegemonic conceptualizations of nations as homes operate within today's global capitalist economy. In this, citizenship and immigration policies are the key avenue through which nationalism is performed.

Immigration policies have historically played a significant part in organizing, materializing, and then regulating national differences. This is why it continues to be onto the bodies of (im)migrants that a foreign identity can most easily be grafted. In this period of increased mobility (of capital, goods, and people), it is the process of *differential inclusion* – not simply exclusion – that works to facilitate how people are seen – and see themselves – as being at home or not in the spaces in which they find themselves.

National Homelessness: The Making of Non-Immigrant 'Migrant Workers' in Canada

Being homeless in Canada is of particular significance for those categorized as temporary, foreign, migrant workers. The making of migrant workers allows us to clearly recognize how nationality operates as a legitimate mode of discrimination. For the last twenty-five or so years, most people (im)migrating to Canada arrive not as immigrants (those with 'landed' or permanent resident status) but as foreign migrant workers. The state category of *foreign worker* is a clear demonstration of how (im)migration controls are inextricably linked with the regulation of citizenship. Together they define who can be a member of the Canadian nation *and* who can legally make claims for protection or benefits from the Canadian national state. With the categorization of people as

migrant workers, the state quietly borrows from the exclusionary practices organized through concepts of citizenship and its ideas of the fictive national society, in order to reposition migrant workers as part of a foreign workforce in Canada.

The categorization of certain (im)migrants as migrant workers is authorized through the regulatory framework of the Non-Immigrant Employment Authorization Program (NIEAP) introduced on 1 January 1973. Its broad parameters are entrenched within successive Canadian Immigration Acts. By law, a migrant worker is the 'foreign worker' who upon arrival must have with her or him an official temporary employment authorization from the Canadian state. This foreign work visa, as it is commonly known, assigns her or him to a specified employer and stipulates her or his occupation, residence, length and terms of employment in Canada (Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC), 1994a:1). Migrant workers must exit the country immediately after their labour contract expires. Written permission from immigration officials is required to alter any of the conditions of work. If the terms are changed without official permission, migrant workers are subject to immediate deportation.

As a result of these conditions, people admitted through the NIEAP are denied the freedoms of labour market and spatial mobility available to those existing within the legal designation of citizen or permanent resident. In fact, the NIEAP exists because it is unconstitutional for the state to restrict the mobility of citizens or immigrants. Such restrictions apply *only* for non-immigrants or 'foreign visitors' who can *legally* be indentured to employers in Canada. The non-immigrant, or migrant worker, category, therefore, allows the social category of foreigner to be fully realized in Canadian law. Through it, the social organization of nationalized difference is materialized within the Canadian labour market and within Canadian society at large.

The NIEAP makes migrant workers available to employers concerned with securing a post-Fordist labour force: efficient, flexible, and globally competitive. Part of the flexibility and competitiveness of migrant workers is that they do not have access to many of the things that capitalist lobby groups complain make Canadian workers 'too expensive': collective bargaining rights and access to social programs and protections (Swanson, 2001). Those categorized as migrant workers have little, or no, de facto claims to the minimum wage and labour standards and protections available to the citizenry (including, for the most part, permanent residents). Migrant workers are also usually

made ineligible for certain social benefits, such as unemployment insurance or welfare payments even while they do pay taxes in the country.

Employers benefit in numerous ways as a result. Migrant workers can be paid much less than citizens or permanent residents and be made to work and live under conditions seen as 'unattractive' to Canadians (Bolaria, 1992; Wall, 1992). Moreover, migrant workers are highly circumscribed from collectively organizing to realize the limited rights they do have access to or to agitate for more. This is mainly for two reasons. First, some migrant workers face severe isolation from other workers. For example, migrant domestic workers must live in the residence of their employer(s) as a condition of their temporary employment authorization. Second, because employers can end the labour contract at any time they are dissatisfied, and since such a termination often results in deportation, migrant workers are severely constrained by the system of patronage that develops (Wall, 1992). Such practices embolden employers and contribute to the substandard conditions found in jobs performed by migrant workers.

Unsurprisingly, then, since the introduction of the NIEAP in 1973, the Canadian state has successfully shifted immigration policy away from a policy of permanent immigrant settlement towards an increasing reliance upon unfree, temporary migrant workers. Such a shift is part of the overall neoliberal turn in state policy. For the majority of the years following its introduction, the number of people admitted to work in the labour market in Canada as immigrants (i.e., permanent residents) has declined both in proportion and in number relative to those recruited as migrant workers. From making up 57 per cent of the total number of those recruited for the Canadian labour market in 1973, only 30 per cent of the (im)migrant workforce received permanent resident status by 1993 (Sharma, 1995a:122). By 2004 the proportion of (im)migrants admitted with permanent resident status was 35 per cent (see table 5.5). By looking only at the numbers of people admitted as part of the independent class,[2] the shift is even greater: by 2004 only 22 per cent of all (im)migrants recruited for the Canadian labour market were given permanent resident status and rights while 76 per cent were recruited as migrant workers (see table 5.6).

Yet, despite such dramatic changes in (im)migrants' status, there has been very little attention and even less outcry about the NIEAP. This is because the NIEAP does not work against but *through* hegemonic notions of Canadian nationness. The commonsensical understanding of

migrant workers is that they are non-Whites from the global South who are lucky to work legally in Canada. The act of allowing Them into the country with a temporary employment authorization is seen as an act of charity extended by Canadians to foreign Others (Arat-Koc, 1992).

In conjunction with bounded ideas of national homes, creating conditions of work that are unacceptable, even illegal, for Canadians is easier to impose on those non-citizens who are also seen as racialized and/or cultural outsiders.[3] Hence, because migrant workers are not entering a 'neutral ideological context' (Miles, 1982:165) when coming to Canada, the NIEAP needs to be located within the ideological organization of the Otherness of non-Whites both historically and during the time of its introduction. A look at Canadian parliamentary debates in the five years prior to 1973 is illuminating in this regard.

As official discourses are an integral part of how the state constructs national society and its members, these debates not only articulate the agenda for specific state policy directions and provide a blueprint for policy implementation, they also shape the discursive framework of state practices. That is, they actively reshape, recreate, and redefine the 'issues of the day' and, as such, constitute a site where a certain kind of discursive practice is put together around the framework of problems and their solutions. In doing so, such official discourses, because they are infused with societal norms and values help to construct subject – and object – identities (Doty, 1996). Part of the work done by such discourses, then, is to provide a particular frame for reading (and hearing) the debates whereby a certain kind of knowledge helpful to the accomplishment of ruling is produced (Smith, 1990).

Kari Dehli (1993:87) notes that such discursive state practices have 'consequences beyond the contexts in which they are written and read.' Parliamentary debates get entered into the work process of state apparatuses and by doing so help to construct categories of legally differentiated membership. These categories become what Lim Pui Huen and Diana Wong (2000) have called 'discursive facts' that shape how people both know and interact with one another. State categories, thus, become cultural forms (Corrigan and Sayer, 1985:3).

Since parliamentary debates take place for the expressed purpose of governing society, they have great power not only in constructing but also legitimizing state categories. Parliamentary debates, in this sense, can be seen as a *technology* of liberal democratic forms of ruling that normalizes both the exercise of state power and the boundaries of those who belong – as well as those that do not – within national soci-

ety (Foucault, 1991). A textual analysis of these debates, then, provides more than an interpretation of the utterances of parliamentarians. Rather, an analysis of them helps to uncover the social relations and social practices that allow these utterances to make common sense. This method of inquiry reveals that parliamentary debates, though not synonymous with ruling relations or state power, are a *form* of constructing knowledge through state practices, a form particularly attentive to the performance aspects of state authority and power.

In the context of Canada's liberal democracy the performance of parliamentary rituals is especially productive of notions of nationhood that legitimate the wielding of state power. This is most clearly evident in the daily Question Period where questions and answers between members of Parliament of different political parties are publicly conducted.[4] Adam Ashforth (1990:11) rightly points out that it would be more useful for us to interpret public performances of this type 'less as instruments of "policy" and "intelligence" and more as symbolic rituals aiding in establishing and reproducing the power of modern states.' Hage adds that debates on immigration in particular ought to be seen 'in a more anthropological spirit, as rituals of *White empowerment* – seasonal festivals where White[s] ... renew the belief in their possession of the power to talk and make decisions about Third World–looking people' (2000:241).

Significantly, the problem that the NIEAP is said to have solved is the problem of the *permanence* of non-Whites within Canadian society. Following the liberalization of Canadian immigration policy in 1967, non-Whites admitted as immigrants, that is, permanent residents, came to have (virtually) the same rights as White Canadians. Moreover, after 1967, a growing proportion of immigrants came from the global South, eventually becoming the majority of new permanent residents by 1974. In the five-year period surrounding the introduction of the NIEAP, a common conceptual practice within Parliament was to organize the discursive problem of there being 'too many' non-Whites in the country and the resulting irreparable damage that was being done to the 'character of Canadian society.'

The NIEAP was one parliamentary solution to this problem. It legalized the resubordination of many non-Whites entering Canada by recategorizing them as temporary and foreign workers. Following the reversal of the liberal policies of the mid to late 1960s, then, the racialized criteria of admittance in Canadian immigration policy was shifted from the pre-1967 categories of 'preferred races and nationalities' onto

the new category of non-immigrant (or migrant) worker. One trend towards the liberalization of racism was met by a counter-trend towards the greater restriction of the rights and entitlements of non-Whites.

Parliamentary discursive practices and the legislative changes they legitimate have, in this, the early part of the latest period of capitalist globalization, worked to reconstruct the idea of nations as homes for some but not Others. One result has been greater competition within the labour market in Canada. This has worked to reorganize national labour markets to become more competitive within global markets for both capital and labour. Parliamentarians, therefore, have contributed both materially and ideologically to processes of globalization. The construction of the NIEAP is, of course, an extension of past global practices that saw non-Whites brought to Canada as indentured workers while Whites were positioned as permanent settlers. Indeed, Hyslop (1999:405) shows that, historically, an imperial White working class made itself through a common ideology of homey racism that was, in part, designed to secure them access to key and relatively privileged parts of nationalized labour markets.

A significant aspect of White, male privilege was the claim to freedom from constraints on their mobility in the labour market. In making their claims to national subjecthood, it was the continuing unfreedom of negatively racialized and gendered Others that consolidated the view among White men that contractual servitude was involuntary labour. Consequently, those made to labour in unfree employment relationships, although integral to the production and reproduction of Canadian society, were constituted (in varying degrees) as foreigners to it. Such arguments came to form an integral part of nationalist practices of Othering. It can be said, therefore, that the freeing of White male workers *strengthened* racialized and gendered understandings of who could be a member of the nation.

Being rendered a foreign Other within Canadian society and working in unfree conditions within its nationalized labour market have, thus, often been historically coterminous. Organizing unfreedom for Others has operated as a technology of keeping these Others in their place, both spatially as well as keeping them as subordinated people within Canadian society. The contemporary practice of organizing a migrant labour force in Canada, many from the global South, demonstrates how racism and sexism continue to operate *through* nationalist practices. Because such practices are seen not only as legitimate but as *necessary* for the defence of the home(land), nationalist practices are

able to accomplish racist and sexist aims in a social and policy environment where explicit racialized criteria in immigration selection have been mostly removed.

In this latest period of globalization, *nationalist* practices that produce feelings of both homeyness and of foreignness have become even more important. Because the state is widely seen to be legitimate in using its power against foreigners, the existence of people as migrant workers in Canada is predicated on naming those 'embraced' by this category as *not* being at home. As in the past, the construction of subordinate categories of entry and work (slave or coolie labour and now migrant worker) shapes the competitiveness and profitability of contained and therefore competitive labour markets.

Thus, in contrast to John Holloway (1994:30) who argues that 'the destruction of personal bondage was also the destruction of geographical constraint,' it is clear that the existence of unfree labour is not predicated on people's spatial *immobility* but on exactly the opposite. Oftentimes (though not always) it is people's dependence on migration across nationalized boundaries that places them in situations where, having been categorized as foreigners, they are denied the same rights that citizens lay exclusive claim to. Immigration policies become the vehicle through which their unfreedom is organized precisely because they allow the national state to utilize its internationally recognized power to determine membership in the nation.

A critical examination of the migrant worker category, thus, reveals that border controls and immigration restrictions are thoroughly ideological. This is for two reasons. First, they do very little to actually control people's mobility across borders. Second, because they are imagined as natural, and as crucial manifestations of state sovereignty, their operation as an integral feature of the global expansion of capitalism is concealed. Thus, whether we talk about such border control spectacle, as the more than 2,000-mile long steel fence erected, patrolled, and armed by the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service across the border separating Mexico from the United States, or the spectacle of 'Europe's new Berlin Wall': the eight-kilometre fence between the Spanish-claimed enclave of Melilla and the rest of Africa or the ever more restrictive immigration policies of virtually every national state in the global North, restrictions on who is legally able to enter with full status do very little to actually restrict migration itself. Nor would I argue are they intended to.

Restricting *immigration* is not tantamount to restricting people's

mobility. In Canada, where there has been a steady closing down of avenues to obtain immigrant (or permanent resident) status over the last thirty years, there has been an increase in the numbers of people legally admitted to work in the country. The categorization of the majority of (im)migrants admitted to the country as migrant workers has meant that they encounter a differential regulation of their labour power and a differentiated position once within Canada than do immigrants. In short, constructing people as foreigners has not resulted in their exclusion from Canadian society. Limits to immigration, then, lay not so much in the ability of states to restrict people's geographical mobility but to restrict their freedom once they are *within* nationalized labour markets.

The greater policing of the purified boundaries of nationalized identities have therefore been beneficial to employers trying to gain advantages from the dramatic increase in people's displacement and subsequent migrations. The simultaneous presence of anti-immigration discourses evident in Canadian parliamentary debates and increases in the number of people entering Canada as non-citizens without permanent, full status are, therefore, not at all contradictory but are instead complementary processes. As Hage (2000:135) comments, 'anti-immigration discourse, by continually constructing the immigrants as unwanted, works precisely at maintaining [their] economic viability to ... employers. They are best wanted as "unwanted."'

Greater competition within national labour markets relies on the social organization of difference and the regulation of this differentiated inclusion through the disciplinary model of nationalism with its exclusionary inclusivity. In this regard, the rhetoric of border controls with its accompanying moral panics against those identified as (im)migrants helps to further the project of capitalist globalization. By first creating a group of foreigners and then presenting Them as the problem facing Us, the reality that the NIEAP, with its institutionalization of differentials in wages and standards, actually works against the interests of *all* workers becomes difficult to see.

Border controls enable national states to reorganize their nationalized labour markets to *include* a group of migrant workers who are made vulnerable to employers' demands through their lack of status. In the current historical juncture where both people's displacement and subsequent migration are occurring at a historically unprecedented level – the United Nations (2003) estimates that every year more than 175 million people migrate across national borders – nationalism, with its legit-

imization of differential treatment for foreigners and citizens, has become a motor force of capitalist globalization. It is the social organization of difference that regulates the space between national homes and global capitalist economics.

To better understand the significance of difference to such ruling projects, we need to problematize the existence of differences by clearly distinguishing between difference and diversity. Diversity is the tangible existence of heterogeneity and mutual reciprocity within nature and within that part of nature that is humanity. Differences, on the other hand, are socially organized inequalities between human beings and between humans and the rest of the planet. The social organization of difference is the effect of practices and beliefs founded upon hierarchies of differential value and worth.

When we say someone is different, we are not recognizing that person's singularity. Instead, we are setting her or him aside as a member of a group that does not meet normative or hegemonic standards for subjecthood, agency, and belonging. Difference, then, is mutually constitutive. It is relational. As Brah (1996:124) points out, 'the proclamation of a specific collective identity is a political process [whereby] the commonality that is evoked can be rendered meaningful only in articulation with a discourse of difference.' It is to this relational aspect of difference that Gregory Bateson (1979:78) refers when he says that 'it takes at least two somethings to create difference ... Clearly each alone is – for the mind and perception – a non-entity, a non-being ... An unknowable, a *Ding an sich*, a sound from one hand clapping.'

In the making of difference, however, the 'two somethings' are quite unequal in their respective ability to affect both the relationship and the representation of themselves. The norms which are constructed through such binary oppositions always pivot on the experiences, desires, and power held by those in the dominant half of Self/Other codes. Frantz Fanon (1965:32) understands this well when he states, 'it is the [colonial] settler who has brought the native into existence and who perpetuates his existence.' Sardar et al. (1993:89) add that within such binaries, even the 'the distinctiveness of a particular Other ... [is] lost in the generality shared with all Others, that of being different ... from the West,' so that one overarching category of Other is created as the definitive opposite of the Self.

The politics of constructing and maintaining negative dualities of worth in which one half of the binary equation is privileged both symbolically and materially is what constitutes the identity politics of rul-

ers (see Bannerji, 1995). This is evident in everyday understandings of difference. People who are different are so identified because of the ways they are seen as standing apart from those with the power to define them. Their difference is organized by the ways they have been negatively racialized, gendered, sexualized, classed, and so on. The lines of difference drawn between Self and Other are related to narratives of belonging.

In this, history and context matter. In Canada it has been the many-centuries' process of colonization that has prepared the groundwork for the contemporary organization of difference. It has been the world view of colonists, informed through the linear ideals and dualistic practices of Western Enlightenment philosophy that has shaped the range and intersectionality of social relations in Canada. The domination of Man over women and all of nature; the violence done to Muslims, Jews, Queers, and other Others; the enclosure of common properties; the construction of 'imagined' nations and races; and the creation of Europe and the colonization of its Others: the relationships structured through these practices have come to shape the everyday understanding of what it means to 'be Canadian' and therefore what it means to be not-Canadian (Sharma, 2001).

The racialization and regulation of diverse indigenous peoples into 'Indians'; the changing hierarchical organization of various racialized populations over time: 'Blacks,' 'Asians,' 'Whites,' 'Irish,' 'southern,' and 'eastern' 'Europeans,' 'Latinos' – all these have been at various times organized in opposition to 'Canadianness.' In short, it is through people's relationship to the Canadian Self-identity of being White, heterosexual, and male that difference has been structured.

The central distinction between difference and diversity, then, is that unlike diversity, difference, perhaps ironically, has *homogeneity* as its architectural frame. The organization of difference is about ensuring conformity to hegemonic beliefs and practices in an attempt to shape the world in the image of dominant groups. Difference, then, is about universalizing a *particular* parochial interest. Vandana Shiva (1997:93) sees the process of taking diversity and filtering out of it any divergence from the norm the creation of a 'monoculture of the mind.'

What, then, are we to make of current attempts to validate and valorize *difference* within postmodern and post-structuralist theory with its rightful attention to the politics of representation and identity (Young, 1989:261)? I will elaborate on this in the concluding chapter of this book. For now, it is important to note only that such celebrations

of difference have often conflated difference with diversity, and this leads to a serious lack of attention to how the organization of differences is a strategy of ruling.

The attempt to end oppressive and exploitative social relations, particularly those of racism, through an acknowledgment of *differences* has led to political solutions such as the official promotion of 'tolerance' for different people. This kind of political practice has come to be called demonstrating a 'respect for diversity.' Of course, the stated aim of this respect is to secure the proper functioning of society as a singular body, again, in the image of Self-defined rulers. In such rhetoric, the nation is thought to be able to simply transcend conflict through a respect and celebration of difference without the eradication of any differentials in power and wealth and with no transformation at a systemic level.

This is, of course, the kind of diversity embraced by the state. It is one that enables those in positions of power over Others to tolerate people who have been differentiated. Yet, as Hage (2000) well notes, when those in positions of power are asked to be tolerant, their power to be intolerant is not taken away from them. It is, in fact, reasserted by the very request to have them not exercise it. In this regard, respect for diversity does not eclipse the social organization of difference but becomes a contemporary form of reproducing hierarchal social relations and recentring the White national subject. It legitimates the continued organization of difference in order to both organize and legitimate the subordination that the differentiated experience.

This kind of *official diversity* needs to distinguished from the kind of diversity I have discussed earlier. Perhaps we need to rename that kind of diversity, *radical diversity* since the former has been co-opted and has come to connote its exact opposite: the power of One (one law, one society, one People) over the Many, or what Deleuze and Guattari (1987) call the 'multiplicity,' and what Hardt and Negri (2000; 2004) refer to as the 'multitude.' Social systems based on radical diversity, unlike those founded on differences, are wholly dependent on maintaining heterogeneity while recognizing commonalities based on shared practice or experience for their continued survival and pleasure.

The social organization of difference is, therefore, a highly ideological practice and one linked to the material production of unjust social relations. In this regard, it is crucial to recognize that difference has its own materiality. Indeed, the entire history of the capitalist mode of production and its ever-expanding global reach has been organized

through the structuring of difference. How one is identified shapes how one is positioned within global capitalism. The accumulation of capital continues to take place through the social and legal differentiation of labour (Lowe, 1996:159).

Within the conceptual carving out of differentiated zones of belonging lie concealed the interconnected relations and mutual constitutiveness between so-called local and global spaces, between the inside and the outside of nations. Indeed, the idea that there exist two supposedly discrete spaces – the national one in which Canadians exist and a global or foreign one that contains Others – has structured the sense of Canadian homeyness that legitimates the subordination of migrant workers within the space occupied by Canada.

The social organization of difference, therefore, always works to create forms of separation, whereby discrimination is organized through exclusionary inclusion. Nationalized differences, in particular, are consequential to the emergence and further entrenchment of what Anthony Richmond (1994) has aptly identified as 'global apartheid.' He refers to the organization of an ever-widening differentiation between people in wealthy and impoverished national states through restrictive immigration policies that imprison impoverished people within zones of poverty. This book continues this work by turning our attention to what happens when foreign-Others *are* allowed into wealthier national states but who, through the exclusionary notion of homelands, remain impoverished and are rendered homeless once there.

This project asks us to politicize the process of identification, particularly state identification schemes. Identifications are always about positioning people within a grid of power in which ideas of belonging mark not where one is located geographically but where one is positioned within the global political economy of home. Differentiated identities are part of a kind of *home economics* whereby people are separated from one another not by space or place but by being 'embraced' by the nation and the state in highly differential ways. Thus, this book asks that we be able to distinguish between diverse self-determined identities and the process of differentiation used to mark Others as subordinated beings.

This book therefore makes the case for nationalism to be seen as a practice that organizes discrimination within a globalized system of national states. Despite or rather *because of* its almost complete hegemonic character – Benedict Anderson (1991:3) notes that 'nation-ness is the most universally legitimate value in the political life of our time' – and because of the enormous consequence nationalism has for the

organization of inequalities, we need to regard nationalism as being one of the key methods by which people are differentiated in order to be ruled over.

This book, then, is about how the nation-state system has limited our sense of Self and belonging and left bankrupt our ability to empathize and connect to people beyond national borders and identities. Our understanding of nationalism needs to look beyond the artificial homeyness of belonging to the nation to include the oppressive practices that purposefully create and maintain national borders between and *within* national states. We must understand that the very practices that purportedly affirm Our belonging in the nation are the same ones that allow the Canadian national state to legitimately mark some Others who live there to be socially and legally inscribed as foreign bodies.

Without challenging nationalist thought and practice, justice for (im)migrants left displaced through the operations of capitalist globalization becomes unthinkable. In today's world, where there is a growing level of displacement and international migration, we desperately need to trouble and unsettle nationalized imaginations. As Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000), point out, this calls for new social bodies that are not founded on any of the prevailing myths that sustain the current World Order: social bodies that can create and carry out a real alternative to the way social relations among us are currently arranged. Such bodies would be based not on imposed identities organized through the binaries embedded within ideas of nation, race, gender, and sexuality, but upon radically diverse ways of organizing life across this planet.

Lest this call is heard as wholly utopian, it is worth noting that many in the world today who, while not able to stand *outside* of capitalist power relations in the sense meant by Deleuze and Guattari (1987), are nonetheless fighting to retain ways of being that are antithetical to the values inscribed by the nexus of capitalism–nationalism. Although not all migrants can be attributed with such aspirations, their acts of spatial mobility across borders do assert a will not contained by hegemonic ideas of home, nationhood, and belonging. They harbour a possibility that human beings can recognize their own value and their own autonomy outside of ruling relations. It is within this possibility that hopes for liberation live. It is for the nurturing of this possibility that this book is written.

2 Globalization and the Story of National Sovereignty

Trying to unravel the various ways in which legitimacy is organized for an immigration and labour market program that recruits the majority of (im)migrants entering Canada as unfree, temporary migrant workers begins with an examination of Canadian state practices in this period of neoliberal restructuring. The formulation of Canada's Non-Immigrant Employment Authorization Program (NIEAP) in 1973, through which the legal category of migrant workers is made, took place during a period widely regarded as the starting point of this, the most recent period of capitalist globalization. Since this time, profound changes have taken place in how social relations of ruling are organized in Canada and throughout the world. The further liberalization of global flows of capital, the retrenchment of key aspects of state welfare policies that helped workers decommodify themselves, the deregulation of the conduct of capitalists, and the expansion of capitalist social relations through intensifying processes of proletarianization and privatization have been examined by a growing body of work investigating changes in the relationships between capital, the state, and citizens.

In this chapter, I examine whether the construction of the migrant worker category can be accounted for by prevalent theories that propose that the further globalization of capital has put an end to the sovereignty of the Canadian national state and an erosion of the duties it has to 'its citizens.' As this question defines the debate between those who are ostensibly concerned with the effects of globalization on workers' rights, I further investigate the link between the assumptions embedded within this key debate to see how it helps to frame the problem of globalization in such a way that legitimizes the conditions of unfreedom 'foreign migrant workers' are made to work in, conditions

Notes

1 Home(lessness) and the Naturalization of 'Difference'

1 I have placed the idea of national communities within scare quotes to signify that I am interested in problematizing its naturalization. Because of my desire to trouble other depoliticized terms, concepts, ideas, and categories, such as state categories of migrant worker, illegal, foreign, race, nation, home or Canadian society, are similarly placed within scare quotes. However, for the sake of easier readability, I will only use scare quotes at the first mention of them.

2 The independent class of immigration recruits people as permanent residents through the 'points system' that evaluates applicants according to their occupation, educational qualifications, and English and French language skills, as well as 'adaptability' to Canadian society and then assesses applicants on their ability to meet a minimum number of 'points' in these areas.

3 Remembering that it is the global system of nation-states that organizes people as either citizens or (im)migrants, it is important to note that the imposition of unfree conditions upon those constructed as (im)migrants is part of a long historical trajectory. For instance, Richard Plender's research shows that the first instance of permanent immigration control, England's Alien Law of 1793, included the ability for the King to limit the spatial mobility of (im)migrants who could be forced to live in a specified district (1972:43). These laws, Petras argues, 'marked the decline of free movement and the establishment of the right of states to impose direct controls on alien immigration' (1980:166). It was during the earlier part of the twentieth century, however, that there was a marked increase in immigration legislation among nation-states. For instance, it was during this time that the international system of passports was first developed (Torpey, 2000).

4 Although traditional political science approaches see MPs of the governing party but not the opposition parties as part of the *government*, I believe it is more fruitful to view the MPs of all political parties as participating in state governance, especially in discursive activities concerned with legitimizing the existence of the state and its power.

2 Globalization and the Story of National Sovereignty

1 Joseph Schumpeter argued that the supply of innovation is central to capitalist growth dynamics (see Moss, 1996).
2 It is in this light that we can make sense of recent shift in trade union bodies, such as the Canadian Labour Congress, from calling for an *abolishment* of international trade agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) of 1994 to demands for a 'seat at the negotiating table' within international fora such as the Forum for Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), WTO, Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), and so on. Such a demand is part of the ongoing efforts of trade union leaders to reinsert themselves in a global North tripartite arrangement of regulating capitalism, supposedly for the benefit of their members.
3 In this sense, it is also important to see the politics of import substitution in the national states of the South as having contributed to the consolidation of the ideology of discrete and sovereign national economies.

3 Imagined States: The Ideology of 'National Society'

1 Historically, the concept of 'character' has been a key organizer of racialized notions of belonging to the Canadian nation. As Valverde (1991:104) notes in her study, 'white people were seen as having more character, as a group, than Native people or people of colour; and among whites, people of British descent were regarded as having the most character.'
2 During the time that White male workers were generally employed under unfree conditions, their status changed when they married and became 'heads' of their own households. Men who were married and heads of their own households could not generally be considered another's indentured servant. Unmarried White men, however, could continue to be subjected to forced employment until the mid- to late-nineteenth century (Steinfeld, 1991:59, 98). Women, regardless of whether they were married or not, continued to be considered as living under the tutelage of the male head of the household – whether father, husband, or son.

It is important, especially for feminists, to understand how White women who were made to work under unfree conditions were simultaneously

oppressed and exploited through sexist practices but were, nonetheless, still imagined as an integral part of the Canadian nation. Thus, though they were considered as belonging to the men of the nation, their gender relations with White men were constructed within the framework of White Canadian nationalism. This helps to explain White feminist arguments for being included in the Canadian franchise in the early part of the twentieth century *because* they were 'mothers of the race' (see Valverde, 1992).
3 Lydia Potts (1990:67) writes that 'during the 19th century and the first few decades of the 20th century, workers from India, China, Japan and Java were despatched to every continent with the exception of Europe [*sic*].' Within the space of less than a hundred years (1830–1920), it is estimated that anywhere from a minimum of twelve million up to thirty-seven million people from Asia were indentured through the coolie system of unfree labour (ibid.:73–4).
4 Rosa Luxemburg's theory of imperialism, in which she develops the idea of articulated modes of production, is a dualist one. She sees imperialism as a process by which the capitalist mode of production uses and continuously reproduces non-capitalist modes of production for its own benefit. For this reason, Luxemburg (1951:365) argues that 'since accumulation of capital becomes impossible in all points without non-capitalist surroundings, we cannot gain a true picture of it by assuming the exclusive and absolute dominion of the capitalist mode of production.' She posits that the very process of capitalist accumulation rests upon the procurement of labour power from non-capitalist modes of production. Luxemburg argues that capitalism, in and of itself, is not able to produce or reproduce *all* of the labour power which it needs and, thus, essentially 'raids' non-capitalist social formations for labour power.
5 Such an approach is also evident in the work of Perry Anderson (1992) who views the expansion of free wage labour as a process accompanying the development of capitalism. He argues that while unfree labour was indispensable in the 'early modern epoch,' it cannot be considered as a part of the capitalist mode of production. He (1975:403) maintains that 'all modes of production in class societies *prior* to capitalism extract surplus labour from the immediate producers by means of extra-economic coercion. Capitalism is the first mode of production in history in which the means whereby the surplus is pumped out of the direct producer is 'purely' economic in form – the wage contract: the equal exchange between free agents which reproduces, hourly and daily, inequality and oppression.'

Along the same lines, Beiguelman (1978:76) has shown that others have normally regarded the abolition of slavery in the United States as 'a progressive purification of capitalism. Since capitalism is a system based on